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ABSTRACT
In this paper we focus on the different historical regime experiences of the core and the periphery.
Before 1914 advanced countries adhered to gold while periphery countries either emulated the advanced
countries or floated.  Some peripheral countries were especially vulnerable to financial crises and debt
default in large part because of their extensive external debt obligations denominated in core country
currencies.  This left them with the difficult choice of floating but restricting external borrowing or
devoting considerable resources to maintaining an extra hard peg.  Today while advanced countries can
successfully float, emergers who are less financially mature and must borrow abroad in terms of advanced
country currencies, are afraid to float for the same reason as their nineteenth century forbearers.  To obtain
access to foreign capital they may need a hard peg to the core country currencies.  Thus the key distinction
between core and periphery countries both then and now that we emphasize in this paper is financial
maturity, evidenced in the ability to issue international securities denominated in domestic currency.
Evidence in Section 2 from Feldstein-Horioka tests 1880-1997 agrees with the ‘Folk” wisdom that
financial integration was as high before 1914 as it is today.  But the evidence suggests that it was not the
exchange rate regime followed that mattered but the presence of capital controls. Moreover the financial
integration observed for the recent period is largely an advanced country phenomenon Section 3 lays out
the financial maturity hypothesis,  presents narrative evidence for the pre-1914 period of the different
experiences of the core and peripheral countries in adhering to the gold standard, and documents that for
the emerging countries, plus ca change. Finally, Section 4 presents empirical evidence for core and
peripheral countries 1880-1913 and today based on traditional money demand regressions suggesting a
strong link between financial depth and the exchange rate regime.
Michael D. Bordo Marc Flandreau
Department of Economics Insititut d'Etudes Politiques
Rutgers University de Paris, OFCE, and CEPR
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Section 1. Introduction 
 
Historians know the crucial importance played by the boundary that separated the core 
of the Roman Empire from its periphery – a boundary known as the Limes. On top of 
being a line of military defense, it was a locus of cross influences. While the “core” 
contributed to shaping the ‘barbarous’ lands located beyond its walls, the “periphery” 
shaped the inner areas, since protection from the dangers of military conflict involved 
providing for such outcomes. And for reasons that are hard to understand, the long 
survival of this frontier extended long after the fall of the Roman Empire: more than 10 
centuries after its collapse, the former Limes surprisingly coincided with the line that 
separated Christians during the religious wars, between Protestants and Roman Catholics. 
In comparison with this very long run phenomenon, the experience of the international 
monetary system is that of a toddler. And yet the recent turmoil in international financial 
markets has forced economists and policy makers to come to grips with something 
                                                 
1. We are grateful to Ignacio Briones, Dhiman Das, Sonal Dhingra, Juan Flores, and David Khoudour-
Casteras for excellent research assistance. We thank Larry Neal, Marc Weidenmeir, Antu Murshid, Ugo 
Pannizza and Anne Jansen for providing data. Comments from our discussant Anna Schwartz, Charlie 
Calomiris, Angela Redish, Chris Meissner, and especially Alan Taylor, and conference participants are 
gratefully acknowledged. Discussions with Frédéric Zumer proved very useful to foster our thinking on the 
Feldstein Horioka regressions. Bordo gratefully acknowledges the financial support of the NBER and the 
National Science Foundation.   3
similar. The recent discussions on the exchange rate regimes that are advisable in order to 
cope with financial instability rest on the observation that the challenges of globalization 
are not quite the same depending on whether we focus on developing countries and 
emerging markets or developed ones. While the latter are free to go their exchange rate 
way, the former are said to face the dilemma of either anchoring themselves to core 
countries with extra strong glue, or remaining out of the Limes of modern integration 
with a volatile exchange rate.  
As a recent literature has argued, there is a certain “fear of floating” among modern 
developing countries. But this is obviously nihil novi sub sole for economic historians 
familiar with that other major experience of globalization, namely that of the late 
nineteenth century. For then, already, there was a “core” that followed the high road of 
more or less complete gold convertibility, and an infamous “periphery” that had trouble 
pegging but resented floating. And it is striking that the list of “peripheral” nations has 
not changed that much over the course of the century: today like yesterday it includes 
Latin American countries, Central Europe, Russia, and to some extent Asia –among the 
latter, Japan was already standing out as an exception
2.  
This persistence nonetheless conceals a profound transformation of the international 
monetary system – a transformation that has occurred at the core of the global exchange 
rate system. Today, flexible exchange rates have superseded, in advanced countries (with 
the notable exception of Europe) the 19
th century system of fixed exchange rates known 
                                                 
2 We use the distinction core versus periphery for the pre 1914 period following a well-established 
tradition in economic history. For the recent period we use the terminology advanced versus emerging 
countries. The difference between the two demarcations is largely geographical (the core pre 1914 meant 
Western Europe and after 1900 the U.S., while the periphery was everyone else). Today advanced countries 
are in every region. The key unifying theme for both demarcations as pointed out by our discussant Anna   4
as the “gold standard”. In other words, “globalization” appears to mean surprisingly 
consistent things in the periphery, but radically opposite things in the core. This may in 
fact sound somewhat paradoxical: in the late nineteenth century globalization was in the 
popular mind associated with the gold standard, and most academics concurred 
(Kemmerer 1916). Yet after the collapse of the Bretton Woods system in the early 1970s 
the heart of the global monetary system is based on floating exchange rates. How do we 
interpret this? On the surface, this would seem to suggest that the exchange rate system is 
quite irrelevant to the process of globalization: nature finds its ways. At the same time, 
how do we make sense of the serious concerns that academics and policymakers have 
over the problem of the appropriate exchange rate system for the emerging countries? 
Why should there be different recipes for the advanced and the emergers? 
The theoretical literature pertaining to the links between integration and exchange rate 
regimes generally overlooks this problem. Two opposite views may be identified. Both 
assume some kind of market imperfection since in a perfectly rational and frictionless 
world, fixed and flexible systems should deliver identical outcomes and the question of 
the links between exchange rate regimes and integration would be irrelevant (Helpman 
1981).  
The “transaction costs” view on the one hand assumes that floating exchange rates are 
a risk that cannot be diversified away and thus tantamount to a distortion preventing full 
specialization. From this perspective a fixed exchange rate may deliver both a higher 
level of integration and superior economic performance. This view is very old and 
originates in 19
th century classical economics.   
                                                                                                                                                 
Schwartz, is that (core) advanced countries are generally capital rich and the (periphery) emerging 
countries are generally capital poor.   5
On the other hand, the “policy view” rests on the notion that, due to the existence of 
nominal rigidities and factor immobility, flexible exchange rates might be advisable to 
smooth out the international adjustment process: exchange rate flexibility, from this 
perspective, is not an enemy to international integration. This view is traditionally 
associated with Robert Mundell, and Padoa-Schioppa’s Trilemma. It has been put to 
work by Barry Eichengreen to explain the (according to the recent literature, partial) 
trend towards fluctuating exchange rates. The expansion of democracy, by calling for an 
increase in income smoothing, has led more and more countries to float their way into 
globalization – again with the notable exception of Europe. 
None of these views, however, takes seriously into account the dichotomy between 
core and peripheral countries. And yet the quite distinct dynamics of exchange rate 
regimes depending on whether we focus on the center or on the periphery suggests that 
different stories may have to be told for each. At the same time, as the comparison with 
the Roman Empire suggests, the record of the center cannot be understood without 
reference to the periphery and vice versa. Systems are tested on their margins. 
In this paper we seek to provide an interpretation of both the presence of ‘fear of 
floating’ in the periphery and the transition to flexible exchange rates in the center. Our 
argument rests on the role of technological progress in money and finance.  In the 
nineteenth century, adherence to gold provided a stable environment that contributed to 
the development of deep and liquid money markets. At the same time, gold convertibility 
was a constraint on monetary policies since it implied currency bands within which core 
nations sought to obtain as much room to maneuver as they could. By the 1970s, 
financial maturity allowed the core countries to float. In a sense in the current floating 
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regime countries, by learning to follow a domestic nominal anchor, have been able to 
eliminate the credibility bands of the classical gold standard, which in its time granted the 
core countries only a modicum of the policy independence they have today.  
By contrast to the core, many peripheral countries pre-1914 lacked what we suggest to 
call the “financial maturity” to successfully adhere to gold. The alternative of floating 
was fraught with danger because they were forced to obtain the foreign capital crucial to 
their development by borrowing in terms of sterling (or other core country currencies) or 
else having gold clauses.   
In times of financial crises, then as now devaluations led to debt crises. Thus we argue 
that peripheral countries then, as now, were forced to adopt super hard fixed exchange 
rates (currency boards or close to 100% gold reserves then, currency boards or 
dollarization now) because they had not developed the financial maturity to float, or else 
they had to restrict foreign borrowing. Thus the link between globalization and the 
exchange rate regime turns out to depend on financial maturity:
3 i.e. ‘Tell us how 
financially mature you are, and we will tell you under what exchange rate regime 
globalization shall have you end up with’. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we set the stage by 
considering the evidence on global financial integration from 1880-1997, using the well-
known Feldstein-Horioka approach. The contribution of our work is that it combines both 
                                                 
3 The main focus of our study is on the exchange rate arrangements of the two periods of globalization i.e. 
of open capital markets and relatively open trade. We do not take a stand on why the global system 
collapsed after 1918 (or more correctly after 1931) and was not re-attained until the 1980s. We are 
sympathetic to the view that the deglobalization of the middle two quarters of the twentieth century had a 
lot to do with the disruptive ‘second thirty year wars’ that began in 1914 and only really ended with the end 
of the cold war. We are agnostic on the views of those who see the breakdown of the global system as 
related to flaws of the gold standard and to those who see it as a backlash to the excesses of the earlier age 
of globalization. 
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cross-section and time series dimensions with an extended sample of emerging countries 
to show a number of disturbing facts that suggest that financial globalization varies a lot 
depending on the type of country core (advanced), periphery (emerging)) and the type of 
regime (floating, fixed) we consider.  This leads to the conclusion that financial 
integration today is primarily an advanced country phenomenon, while the link with the 
exchange rate regime is a complex one. 
Section 3 lays out the “financial maturity” hypothesis and presents narrative evidence 
for the pre 1914 period of the different experiences of the core and peripheral countries in 
adhering to the gold standard. 
Section 4 presents some empirical evidence on the link between financial depth and 
the exchange rate regime for core (advanced) and peripheral (emerging) countries 1880-
1913 and today. 
Section 5 summarizes our findings and suggests some lessons from history. 
 
      Section 2. Financial integration, exchange rate regimes and hollowing out 
In this section, we use saving-investment correlation tests (Feldstein and Horioka 
[1980]). S-I tests seek to measure the degree of financial integration by examining the 
relationship between saving and investment. Integration is high if the correlation of a 
regression of investment on savings is low and vice versa: in the latter case investment is 
constrained by domestic savings while it is not in the former case. Feldstein-Horioka’s 
analysis sparked a considerable research effort. One important area of research was the 
analysis of the historical behavior of correlation coefficients in order to document the 
historical progress of international financial integration. Standard references in this field   8
are Bayoumi (1990), Tesar (1991), Zevin (1992), Eichengreen (1992), Obstfeld (1995), 
Jones and Obstfeld (1997), Bayoumi (1997), Obstfeld and Taylor (1998).
4 These works 
outline the now famous inverted u-shaped pattern of financial integration, which is 
obtained when one plots the results from a series of annual cross section regressions for 
the period 1880-1995 (Figure 1)
5. The message seems to be that, after the interruption of 
the interwar years, the world is heading towards re-globalization that recalls nineteenth 
century patterns. We refer to this as the Folk’s view. 
Figure 1: The Inverted U-shaped Pattern of Financial Integration 
 
Source: Flandreau and Rivière (1999) 
                                                 
4 See Flandreau and Rivière (1999) for a survey. 
5 The countries were: Argentina, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Ireland, Island, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, New Zealand, Netherlands, Portugal, 
Russia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. For data sources see appendix to Flandreau and Riviere 





























Flandreau et Rivière [1999]  9
2.1 Taking panel econometrics seriously 
We seek to show that this wisdom is too simple and conceals a number of finer 
phenomena. This is done by extending existing analyses in two critical directions. First, 
we supplement the traditional cross section regressions by panel estimates. Second, when 
this can be done (i.e. for the post-1973 period) we supplement the traditional group, of 
primarily advanced countries that researchers have been looking at, by a large sample of 
emerging countries. 
The importance of panel econometrics for analyzing saving investment correlation 
was emphasized by Krol (1996), Coiteux and Simon (2000) and Flandreau and Rivière 
(1999). Panel data such as the ones used in FH regressions have two dimensions. 
Research on the long run behavior of saving investment regressions has focused on the 
inter-individual dimension, computing cross section regressions either on annual data on 
or individual averages for given periods. These latter estimates are known as “between” 
estimates. They may be thought of as generalizations of point wise cross section 
regressions.  
One problem with “between” estimates, though, is that they introduce a number of 
biases in the estimation technique. For instance, they tend to overestimate “true” 
disintegration when current accounts experience frequent reversals since averaging wipes 
out those reversals. This is why ‘within’ estimates are in our view a much sounder 
measure since they highlight an essential dynamic dimension of financial integration by 
focusing on the ability of countries to finance changes in their current account position. 
Indeed, within estimates measure whether increases in investment above average can   10
occur without running into an investment constraint. A third possible estimate, known as 
‘pooling’ gives equal weight to the time and individual dimensions. 
Figure 2 shows the results of computing triplets of estimates (pooling, within, 
between) for the standard sub-periods people have focused on and for the typical group of 
countries for which such estimates have been computed before. As can be seen, while the 
popular inverted u-shaped pattern is discernible, the precise picture depends on the 
estimator used.  
While the three estimates give a similar picture for the pre-1914 period, “within” 
estimates suggest that the interwar was less “closed” than has been assumed, probably 
because the frequency of current account reversals during those years tends to average 
out the countries’ short term ability to use foreign capital. Moreover, we observe huge 
discrepancies among the various estimates for the period after 1973. This suggests that 
while some countries have dramatically increased their ability to use the foreign capital 
market, the sample’s ability at financing current account imbalances has increased much 
less. In what follows we shall give accordingly special weight to the “within” estimates 
which might sound as a better measure
6, although for the sake of completeness, we will 
report all three measures. 
2.2 Regimes of financial integration 
Having emphasized the importance of panel estimates, our strategy is the following: 
using a sample similar to the one previous scholars have worked with, we replicate 
benchmark estimates of saving-investment correlation by sub periods and compare these 
                                                 
6  As will be seen, the standard errors of between estimates are always larger than those of the two other 
alternative estimators.   11
with the estimates one obtains for sub-groupings which we think may be relevant, 
because they were characterized by arrangements implying exchange rate stability.
7  
In this fashion, we identify (a) gold countries before 1914, (b) gold countries, gold 
bloc members and sterling area members in the interwar, (c) countries that pegged to the 
dollar under the fixed Bretton Woods era
8, and finally (d) members of the European 
exchange rate mechanism (ERM) after 1979.
9 Our goal is to see whether these groupings 
succeeded in achieving significantly higher levels of integration than the sample at large. 
The intuition is that, if exchange rate stability is an instrument meant to unlock 
participating countries’ current account constraints, then we should observe lower betas 
for sub-groupings than for the sample at large. 
                                                 
7  Our sample only differs from the existing one in that some corrections were made. For instance, the 
sample used by Eichengreen, Taylor and others has France importing capital before 1914 while Levy-
Leboyer shows that it was exporting.  
8 We identified the arrangements using data from Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Bordo (1993) and Ghosh et 
al (1995) 
9  We compute this restriction rather than a restriction to fixed exchange rate regimes because of problems 
with identifying these regimes to which we return to below.   12
 













Table 3 displays the results. They show that for the pre-WWI period, countries that 
strictly adhered to gold do not seem to have been able to achieve a significantly greater 
degree of financial openness than those who did not. The estimated beta for both the 
entire population and the restricted sample shows figures that are very close to each other 
so that it is impossible to reject the null that they are the same.  
The inter-war years reveal an interesting pattern: we see that countries that adhered to 
gold, as well as members of the sterling zone, actually achieved less integration than the 
international average reported in Table 3. The straightforward interpretation of this is 
probably that members of the interwar gold standard could only retain membership 
through capital controls thus actually achieving less integration than the sample at large. 
A similar result is in fact obtained for the Bretton Woods period, probably for the very 
same reason.    13
Finally, moving to the recent experience we see that ERM membership did succeed in 
reducing the beta parameters compared to the entire sample.
10 At the same time, since we 
know that the making of the euro was accompanied by a companion capital movement 
liberalization within European countries, it is not clear whether the greater integration is 
due to exchange rate stability or to lower controls. 
At this stage, one forceful conclusion that emerges is that fixed exchange rate regimes 
were not in the nineteenth century an instrument for financial integration. Financial 
integration has been directly related to the presence or absence of capital controls, and 
these controls have been used in both periods of fixed and flexible exchange rates. The 
pre 1914 period stands out as one that was exceptionally free from these controls rather 
than one whose globalization was related to exchange rate stability since, as observed, the 
restriction of the integration coefficient to those countries that did not float is not higher 
than the one obtained by the entire sample. In fact, it is quite striking to see that even with 
fixed exchange rates, even with no capital controls at all, the degree of integration 
achieved was not perfect. We think that these findings are consistent with the notion that 
globalization in the nineteenth century caused the adoption of the gold standard, rather 
than the other way round, and the remainder of the paper shall seek to develop this 
intuition. 
                                                 
10 . In this part, we use the Folk’s sample. The very low pooling and between estimates come from the 
inclusion of Luxembourg. Results without Luxembourg are respectively P :0.700, W : 0.521, B : 0.819 and 
for the restriction to Europe P :0.551, W : 0.502, B : 0.664. As can be seen the within estimates are much 
more robust than the between and pooling.   14
Table 3. Financial Integration: Benchmark estimates and fixed exchange rates 



















P: 0.460 (0.030) 
W: 0.437 (0.030) 
B: 0.482 (0.184) 
P: 0.768 (0.027) 
W: 0.641 (0.030) 
B: 0.971 (0.082) 
P: 0.863 (0.019) 
W: 0.784 (0.022) 
B: 0.944 (0.090) 
P: 0.339 (0.026) 
W: 0.681 (0.106) 
B: 0.224 (0.035) 
Restriction to 
Gold Standard 
P : 0.445 (0.038) 
W :  0.475 
(0.037)  
B : 0.459 (0.211)  
Nob = 433 (15 countries) 
P : 1.015 (0.066) 
W :  0.876 
(0.082)  
B : 1.082 (0.096)  




  P : 0.808 (0.048) 
W :  0.804 
(0.088)  
B : 0.854 (0.110)  
Nob = 63 (8 countries) 
   
Restriction to G. 
S. + Gold Bloc 
  P : 0.943 (0.049) 
W :  0.864 
(0.056)  
B : 1.002 (0.106)  




  P : 0.693 (0.055) 
W :  0.676 
(0.060)  
B : 0.677 (0.216)  





  P : 0.932 (0.025) 
W :  0.809 
(0.030)  
B : 1.042 (0.088) 




   P : 0.089 (0.028) 
W :  0.316 
(0.057)  
B :  0.0944 
(0.099)  
Nob = 196  (13 countries) 





                                                 
11 . Similar results can be found in Flandreau and Rivière. The only difference comes from minor updates in 
the database.   15
 
2.3.  Expanding the horizon: developed and emerging integration since 1973 
 
In order to go beyond these findings, we extend existing analyses in a second 
direction. We seek to expand the “Folk” sample used in the literature (essentially 
developed countries plus Argentina) to include for the more recent period a large number 
of emerging countries in Asia and Latin America. While data availability limits the 
number of “emerging” countries that can be identified during the late nineteenth century 
(and thus the significance of tests conducted on more limited samples), such is not the 
case for the more recent period. This enables us to make systematic comparisons between 
performances in the core (advanced) and in the periphery (emerging).
12 For this purpose 
we constructed an expanded database comprising 46 countries and spanning the period 
1973-1998. The Folks’ database is embedded in this broader set
13. To document the 
properties of the expanded sample, we run cross section regressions for the period after 
1973. As can be seen, the trend towards greater financial integration after 1973 captured 
by estimates based on the Folk’s sample (the right part of the inverted U)  
 
                                                 
12 . Earlier exercises in Flandreau and Rivière (1999) based on the folk’s sample plus five emergers 
suggested that the record of peripheral countries might be different from that of developed ones. 
13 . The additional countries are: Brazil, Chile, China, Colombia, Egypt, Hong Kong, Hungary, India, 
Indonesia, Israel, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Czech Rep, Russia, Singapore, South 
Africa, South Korea, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, Venezuela. For data sources see data appendix to 
Flandreau and Riviere (1999) available on request, also IFS. 
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Figure 3: Financial Integration 1973-1997 differs between advanced and 
emerging Countries. 
 
mostly reflects the properties of the sample itself. In other words, it shows that there was 
indeed a process of financial integration, but this process varied a lot along the individual 
dimension as illustrated by the increase in the cross section correlation for emerging 
countries in the second half of the 1980s. Moreover, extracting from the sample countries 
belonging to the European Union shows that the trend towards greater integration that 
many authors have emphasized is truly a story about European integration. The 
disproportionate share of European nations in the sample has led scholars – unknowingly 
– to eurocentric conclusions. 
In line with the previous discussion however, it is obvious that one cannot restrict 























Folk's sample + 7 Emergers




we thus use our new sample to compute benchmark estimates and test in a second stage 
whether restrictions to given exchange rate regimes are associated with higher or lower 
levels of integration.  
The identification of exchange rate regimes is more complex today than it was one 
century ago when the choice was between paper and gold. We decided to rely on the 
Masson and Levy-Yeyati & Sturznegger (LYS) classifications of countries by type of 
exchange rate regime (Masson 2001, LYS 2001). Both provide country classifications 
that recognize that modern exchange rate regimes can be of the fixed, floating, or 
intermediary category. Since one needs to cross the information available in our sample 
and that available in either the Masson or LYS databases, one is bound to lose some 
countries/observations in the process. We end up with two restricted databases of 42 
(Masson) or 35 (LYS) countries, whose properties, when one considers both samples in 
their entirety, are almost identical.
14 
The Masson classification works with the IMF categories but follows an earlier IMF 
study by Ghosh et al (1995) which demarcated the IMF’s 26 categories into just 3 
(flexible, Intermediate and Floating).
15 Masson rearranges the Ghosh categories by 
defining flexible as strictly independent floats, fixed as hard pegs (currency boards and 
announced pegs with no change in parity), with the remainder classified as intermediate. 
As a result Masson has a much smaller number of truly fixed or truly flexible regimes, 
with the bulk of the sample being made of intermediate regimes. 
                                                 
14 . We checked this by running pooling, within and between estimates. Results (available upon request) are 
virtually identical, a result of the broad overlap between the two samples. 
15 Flexible arrangements included crawling pegs, target zones, managed floats and independent floats. 
Pegged arrangements include single currencies, SDR pegs, other official basket pegs, and secret pegs.   18
The LYS indicators use measures of the volatility of exchange rates and international 
reserves and cluster analysis to classify countries into 4 groups (floating, dirty floating, 
crawling pegs and fixed).
16 The classification is based on the theoretical prior that 
countries which really float should have greater exchange rate volatility and smaller 
international reserve movements than those which do not. We further classified the LYS 
classification into three by combining dirty floats and crawling arrangements into an 
intermediate category. Thus our re-arrangement of the LYS classification gives much 















                                                 
16 They also have another category called inconclusive that results from the statistical technique employed, 
which we omit in our classification scheme.   19
Table 4a. The World According to Masson (1973-1997) 
 
 
 Total  Fixed  Intermediate  Floating 
Total sample  P: 0.703  (0.018) 
W: 0.527 (0.025) 
B: 0.812 (0.053)  
Nob = 1017 (42 countries)
P: 0.441 (0.128) 
W: -0.102 (0.220) 
B: 0.672 (0.164) 
Nob = 42 (5 countries) 
P: 0.747 (0.021) 
W: 0.511 (0.029) 
B: 0.866 (0.056) 







Nob = 198 ( countries) 
Developed  P: 0.718 (0.027) 
W: 0.737 (0.036) 
B: 0.704 (0.101)  
Nob = 550 
P : -0.251 (0.202)  
W : 0.295 (0.228) 
B : N.A. 
Nob=21 (2 countries  :3 
et13) 
P: 0.736 (0.038)  
W: 0.654 (0.045)  
B: 0.837 (0.104)  










P :0.793 (0.032)  
W :0.615 (0.044) 
B :0.911 (0.095)  
Nob=341 
P :0.446 (0.198) 
W : -0.153 (0.344)
B :0.676 (0.237) 
Nob=19 (3 countries  : 
25,36,46) 
P :0.838 (0.031)  
W :0.615 (0.046)  
B :0.919 (0.096) 







Nob=43 (5 countries) 
Emerging Asia  P :0.833 (0.060)  
W :0.850 (0.080) 






P :0.757 (0.079)  
W :0.826 (0.085)  
B :0.610 (0.128)  





B : impossible 
Nob=  18 (1 country) 
Emerging 
Latin America 
P :0.521 (0.046) 
W :0.478 (0.057) 
B :0.603 (0.159) 
Nob=176 
P :0.455 (0.209) 
W : -0.311 (0.357)
B : N.A. 
Nob=15 (2 
countries :25,46) 
P :0.573 (0.049)  
W :0.516 (0.052)  
B :0.623 (0.210)  
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Table 4.b. The World According to LYS (1973-1997) 
 
 
 Total  Fixed  Intermediate  Floating 
Total sample  P: 0.727 (0.021) 
W: 0.617 (0.028) 
B: 0.808 (0.071) 
Nob=848 (35 countries) 
P: 0.542 (0.069) 
W: 0.196 (0.091) 
B: 0.766 (0.137)) 
Nob=129 (16 countries) 
P: 0.766 (0.037) 
W: 0.481 (0.058) 
B: 0.810 (0.080) 








Developed  P: 0.685 (0.029) 
W: 0.699 (0.038) 
B: 0.676 (0.119) 
Nob= 467 (18 countries) 
P : 0.487 (0.113) 
W : 0.164 (0.119) 
B : 0.743 (0.283) 
Nob=84 (9 countries) 
P: 0.526 (0.057)  
W: 0.615 (0.097)  
B: 0.578 (0.096)  










P :0.756 (0.031) 
W :0.562 (0.043) 
B :0.884 (0.086) 
Nob=357 (16 countries) 
P :0.476 (0.097)  
W : 0.224 (0.148) 
B :0.658 (0.128) 
Nob=45 (7 countries) 
P :0.794 (0.043)  
W :0.463 (0.071)  
B :0.869 (0.100)  








Emerging Asia  P :0.723 (0.065) 
W :0.850 (0.080) 
B :0.791 (0.130) 
Nob=112  (5 countries) 
P : 0.704 (0.072) 
W : 0.895 (0.128) 
B : 0.630 (0.099) 
Nob=17 (3 countries) 
P :0.698 (0.087)  
W :0.507 (0.123)  
B :0.877 (0.161)  





B :  0.774 
(0.096)  
Nob=  23 (3 countries) 
Emerging 
Latin America 
P :0.523 (0.046)  
W :0.480 (0.055) 
B :0.611 (0.168)  
Nob=184 (8 countries) 
P :0.440 (0.149) 
W : 0.168 (0.217) 
B : 0.652 (0.049) 
Nob=22 (3 countries) 
P :0.339 (0.064)  
W :0.454 (0.081)  
B :0.376 (0.159)  
Nob=77 (8 countries) 





Nob=82 (8 countries) 
Source : Authors’ computations 
 
The results which we get from these exercises are documented in Table 4 a and b. 
First, it appears that there are several ‘patterns’ of financial integration. We find 
important distinctions among emergers, and also among regimes. In practice, while Asian   21
countries are less financially open than the average, Latin American nations are more 
open for both the Masson and LYS databases.  
The effects of alternative exchange rate regimes on financial integration is also 
interesting. Developed countries are more integrated when they fix, but to a certain extent 
also when they float, at least according to LYS. This is interesting because floating 
developed countries are typically made of large mature economies with sophisticated 
financial systems such as Britain or the United States, while fixing developed countries 
typically include small open economies such as Austria.  
We take these results as illustrating how financially deep economies, while floating, 
can nonetheless achieve high levels of financial integration that can compare with 19
th 
century gold standard records. On the other hand, smaller countries may find themselves 
opting for a fixed exchange rate regime because they are very open rather than open 
because they have a fixed exchange rate system. 
Emerging countries face varied experiences: as can be seen from the Masson data 
base, emerging Latin countries are highly integrated at both ends of the exchange rate 
regime spectrum with intermediate regimes being less integrated. Something similar is 
also perceptible in the LYS database, especially if we recall the greater significance we 
attach to the within estimates. For Asian countries, by contrast the opposite is obtained: 
there, intermediary regimes correspond to comparatively higher, not lower levels of 
integration than extreme floats or fixed regimes. However, even for the intermediate 
category the degree of integration achieved is very low.  
This certainly gives support to Fischer’s view that developing countries, which are not 
very exposed to international capital flows, have the opportunity to adopt intermediate   22
exchange rate options (Fischer (2001)). These results, to us clearly support the notion that 
more open countries will end up either in a fixed exchange rate system or in a flexible 
one. 
To sum up, we found that a large part of the extensive integration which the advanced 
countries have achieved has to do with European integration that has been able to drive 
Europe over and beyond what has been achieved elsewhere under both fixed and flexible 
exchange rates. We think that this should be seen as a result of the liberalization of 
financial services, which Europe has implemented, rather than as a result of the exchange 
rate regime per se. A number of advanced floaters have in effect been quite good at 
implementing financial openness: while a fixed exchange rate regime in advanced 
countries often goes with higher integration, a flexible one might do quite well too.  
Moreover, our results support the hollowing out hypothesis for emerging countries, 
since they show that the trend towards greater integration has split Latin America into 
two groups where financial integration has in turn forced the adoption of either floating 
or fixed exchange rate regimes. By contrast, Asia has been able to retain intermediate and 
both fixed and floating exchange rate regimes because it has remained on average more 
financially closed than the rest of the world.  
In other words, the exchange rate regime is a product of globalization, and 
globalization has caused a polarization between floating and fixed exchange rates – a 
process known as hollowing out. Only those who have maintained a degree of financial 
insulation have been able to postpone the choice. Again, globalization appears to have 
been the driving force. 
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Section 3. Brave New World: Is Financial Vulnerability a Discovery of the 1990s? 
The previous section has suggested that causality goes from globalization to the 
exchange rate regime
17. In this section, we carry on with this line of analysis. We survey 
the recent literature on exchange rate regimes and financial crises and argue that it has a 
lot to say about 19
th century macroeconomic problems. 
3.1 Exchange rate regimes and financial crises: the modern literature. 
The experience of both advanced and emerging countries on financial crises teaches us 
that pegged exchange rates invariably succumb to speculative attacks. From a theoretical 
point of view, this can be explained as a result of growing tensions between the peg and 
domestic economic conditions (Krugman 1979, Obstfeld 1984). The general lesson seems 
to be that the only alternatives in the face of mobile capital are floating or a hard fix such 
as a currency board, dollarization, or membership in a monetary union. 
Thus, the “corner solutions” literature has developed on the notion that emerging 
countries (and to a certain extent developed ones as well) must choose between fixed and 
floating regimes, but cannot durably remain in any intermediary system. More 
fundamentally, the flexible “corner” has come under further attack in the “fear of 
floating” literature – according to which seemingly “flexible” countries do not truly float, 
because in effect, such a policy is for them both inefficient and dangerous. The argument 
runs as follows: in principle, a country that experiences a shock can adjust by lowering 
the exchange rate. This is supposed to enable that country to enjoy transitorily lower 
interest rates so that output may recover. But according to Hausmann, Gavin, Pages and 
                                                 
17 In a previous draft of this paper we used gravity equations to analyze the relationship between trade 
integration and the exchange rate regime. Our results for the 1880-1939 period complement those presented 
above for financial integration and the exchange rate regime. We found , amongst other things, that   24
Stein  (1999), this aspirin, while it may have been good medicine for European nations in 
the 1990s, in effect gives headaches to Latin American countries. According to this view, 
the record for Latin American countries is that letting the exchange rate go, forces an 
increase in interest rates and causes a major decline of output. 
This is because exchange rate depreciation in turn triggers a capital flight, perhaps 
because that country relies heavily on foreign capital (so that exchange rate depreciation 
signals serious problems ahead). Another mechanism goes through the share of external 
debt that is denominated in a foreign currency. Today, only a very limited number of 
about 25 countries can issue debt in their own currency. As a result exchange crises may 
cause a debt crisis. In such a setting, emerging markets would be better off to peg, even if 
rampant “peso” problems imply for them that pegging, whatever the amount of glue they 
use, does not automatically buy lower interest rates. At least, the argument goes, 
countries doing so would be protected from short-term external disturbances, which they 
would not have to shore up against. 
 
3.2. Credibility, interest rates, and monetary policy 
For students of the gold standard, it is striking how familiar the “modern” view 
sounds, if only we look carefully at the record. The European aspirin, on the one hand, 
closely resembles what a large body of literature has described as the normal state of 
affairs for “core” members of the gold standard. Because exchange depreciation (be it the 
result of suspended convertibility or a widening of the gold bands through the well 
                                                                                                                                                 
exchange rate volatility did not significantly hinder bilateral trade and, while adhering to gold was 
associated with greater trade, it seems as if this is explained by deeper institutional forces at work.   25
known “gold devices”) was not expected to last
18, these nations, often also being the 
more developed ones, enjoyed a measure of short-term policy flexibility that enabled 
them to buffer transitory shocks, very much in the same fashion modern developed 
floaters can do: exchange rate depreciation did not induce capital flight.  
Recent tests have suggested that in effect, support was provided by the market itself 
which took bets on the eventual re-appreciation of the currency thus enabling monetary 
authorities to lower interest rates and thus compensate for declining output, in other 
words that the gold points served as a credible target zone (Hallwood, MacDonald and 
Marsh 1996, Bordo and MacDonald 1997). Working with data from the Vienna forward 
market Flandreau and Komlos (2001) have shown that “modern” target zone theory was 
in fact invented and successfully applied in the Austria-Hungary of the early twentieth 
century, once it had stabilized its currency. In the case of large foreign shocks (such as 
during the crisis of 1907) Austria-Hungary would let its exchange rate go. This triggered 
stabilizing expectations that enabled the monetary authorities to keep a lower interest rate 
than abroad, with speculators taking bets on an eventual re-appreciation.  
Thus to a certain extent, the current trend towards floating in advanced countries has 
some resemblance to a classical gold standard in which the fluctuation margins have 
been, in line with Keynes (1931) proposal
19, widened to give more flexibility. The key 
difference between then and now is that the nominal anchor -- gold parity, around which 
the target zone operated, has been jettisoned and a domestic nominal anchor has been 
substituted in its place, which allows exchange rate flexibility without the constraints of a 
                                                 
18 This is the logic of what Bordo and Kydland (1995) refer to as the gold standard as a contingent rule. 
19 Keynes (1931) pp.314-331.   26
target zone. Thus if the degree of flexibility compared to the gold standard is greater, the 
spirit is the same, a point to which we will come back later.
20 
This possibility for the core countries of the classical gold standard era, to actually 
“manage” the money supply despite the gold constraints, is in sharp contrast with what 
countries in the European periphery, in Asia, or in Latin and Central America could do. 
On the one hand, floating did not create much room for them to conduct active 
monetary policies. Exchange depreciation often triggered expectations of further 
depreciation rather than expectations of eventual stabilization. For instance, Flandreau 
and Komlos (2001) show that intriguingly enough, it was the stabilization of the Austro-
Hungarian currency that opened the door to active monetary policies. During the 
infamous period of exchange rate gyrations that extended until the mid-1890s, exchange 
depreciation was not usually followed by expectations of an eventual recovery – unlike 
what would happen when the country regained credibility after joining the gold standard 
in 1896. 
On the other hand, going onto gold did not buy immediate credibility as illustrated by 
the levels of short-term interest rates in a number of typical members of the periphery. 
Figures 4a to 4e show that the weaker members of the gold club faced higher short term 
interest rates even when on gold than is consistent with their actual exchange rate record. 
This suggests some kind of “peso” problem. The high short-term rates faced by Chile, 
Greece, Portugal, Italy, or Russia, during their more or less extended flirt with gold 
                                                 
20 . Thus we are not arguing that monetary authorities are following a target zone approach as advocated 
by e.g., Bergsten and Williamson (1983). But rather that the credibility of adhering to gold convertibility 
gave the core countries pre 1914 the flexibility to conduct discretionary policy within the gold points as if 
they were operating in a target zone a la Krugman (1991) and Svennson (1994), whereas today the 
credibility attached to following monetary rules such as inflation targeting, gives the monetary authorities 
the freedom to operate with much greater flexibility without the bands of a target zone.   27
suggest that the problems that the “modern” periphery has with pegging have nineteenth 
century precedents. The fact that even when on gold, these countries could face high 
short term interest rates, might explain why some of them ended up floating. An 
interesting case from that perspective is Chile whose attempt at returning onto gold in 
1895-98, involved both a sharp increase in interest rates – because that decision was not 
credible – and a substantial fall in the rate of inflation: with the result that the 
stabilization was associated with huge real interest rates, recession, and a quick reversal 
to floating exchange rates (Subercaseaux 1926). Plus çà change... 
 




















Shaded area represents the period when Chile was on the gold standard.  
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Shaded area represents the period when Greece was on the gold standard. 
 

















Shaded area represents the period when Portugal was on the gold standard. 
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Shaded area represents the period when Russia was on the gold standard. 
Source: See Data Appendix. 
 










Shaded area represents the period when Italy was on the gold standard. 
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3.3. Fear of floating, 19
th century style: a new view of the gold standard 
 
If going on gold was so costly for the periphery, one may wonder why a number of 
countries nonetheless sought to stick to gold. We argue that this choice rested on 
something quite similar to the current “fear of floating” dilemma. If fixing was quite 
painful under the gold standard for many of the peripheral countries, floating could be 
just as deadly as today. This was due to pervasive problems of currency mismatch arising 
from the inability, for underdeveloped borrowing countries, to issue foreign debts in their 
own currency. 
It is well known from the works of historians that the financial markets of the less 
developed countries were very backward.
21 This led governments of the European or 
Latin American periphery to issue their debts in the large financial markets of the core 
countries, such as London, Amsterdam, Paris or later Berlin, which by contrast had 
developed early on (Neal 1990). In effect, the investors in peripheral countries developed 
the habit of holding that part of their wealth which they invested in domestic bonds in the 
large markets of the core countries (Broder 1975, Levy-Leboyer 1976, De Cecco 1991). 
Borrowing abroad also implied borrowing in foreign currencies. Today, many 
emerging countries find it impossible to borrow abroad in their own currency. Ricardo 
Haussmann and various co-authors
22 refer to these nations as suffering from “original 
sin”. Something similar existed one century ago. According to John Francis (1859), 
exchange rate guarantees in international bond issues was an innovation that had been 
                                                 
21 . See Rousseau and Sylla. (2001) 
22 See Haussmann,Gavin, Pages-Serra and Stein (1999), Haussmann, Pannizza and Stein (2000), 
Fernandez-Arias and Haussmann (2000), Eichengreen and Hausmann (1999)   31
pioneered by the London Rothschilds.
23 The guarantees were widely used during the 
boom of Latin American bond issues of the 1820s.
24 As foreign investment soared, this 
practice became widespread. Prior to the advent of the gold standard, countries were 
alternatively tied to gold, silver or bimetallic currencies depending on the market they 
were tapping. With the spread of the gold standard in Western Europe, gold clauses 
generalized.
25 
Fully comprehending the logic of these gold clauses is a theoretical challenge which is 
beyond the scope of this paper. It is not clear, for instance, why investors should have 
preferred a lower exchange rate risk – but with a greater default risk when exchange rate 
crises occurred, to a higher exchange rate risk but a lower risk of default.  
One possible answer is that, in a system where instruments to hedge against long run 
exchange rate risks were not available, the clauses enabled foreign investors to pass on 
the costs of exchange risk to issuing governments or corporations.
26 This was one way 
contemporaries rationalized this practice, emphasizing that it was motivated by the “risk 
aversion” of foreign investors.
27 But this would imply that contemporaries were more 
willing to run default risk than exchange rate risks.      
                                                 
23 . “ Previous to the advent of Mr. Rothschild, foreign loans were somewhat unpopular in England, as the 
interest receivable abroad, subject to the rate of exchange, liable to foreign caprice, and payable in foreign 
coin. He introduced the payment of the dividends in England, and fixed it in sterling money, one great 
cause of the success of these loans in 1825 ” pp. 298-9. See also Ferguson (1998) Vol. 1, pp. 732-3. 
24 . Fodor (2000) 
25 . Flandreau (2000) argues that this contributed to tying countries to the monetary system of the financial 
center on which they depended, thus contributing to the emergence of regional groupings such as the Latin 
Union. 
26 . There were forward exchange markets, but only for a small number of currencies, and only for short 
horizons (Einzig 1937). We are not aware of swap contracts that would have involved long term cover 
against exchange rate risk. The only kind of protection against exchange rate volatility would have been 
diversification, which by definition does not provide full insurance. 
27 On Russia see de Block, (1889) p. 214, “ Pour décider ces capitalistes à engager leurs fonds dans une 
entreprise dont l’avenir pour eux était incertain, il fallut leur garantir un minimum normal de revenu annuel 
sur les actions et obligations de chemins de fer russes, en fixant ce minimum sur l’étalon métallique ” On 
Spain, Austria and Hungary see Lévy (1901): “ Chez nous surtout où les rentiers quelque peu timorés et   32
Second, this practice might be understood as the solution to a commitment problem. 
While local issues could be easily inflated away, foreign issues with gold clauses 
provided safeguards, precisely because they in turn induced governments to be on their 
guard.
28 Figure 5 gives some support to this view as it shows that the share of gold debt 
was an increasing function of total indebtedness for a number of peripheral countries. On 
the other hand, it is hard to determine the extent to which markets and governments were 
in a position to internalize the consequences of gold clauses plus exchange depreciation: 
in the politically unstable, revolution driven Latin America, could pre-commitment 
actually work? Moreover, while commitment might explain why some debt would have 
been issued with gold clauses, it is not clear why all debt issued abroad should have 
included such clauses. 
                                                                                                                                                 
mal au courant des questions de change ont marqué de tout temps une grande répugnance à admettre dans 
leur portefeuille des titres dont le revenu ne fût pas stable; la première condition de cette fixité du coupon 
étant celle de la monnaie la conséquence naturelle de cette exigence légitime de notre public a été la 
création de nombreux titres étrangers stipulés payables en francs ou en or. L’un des premiers a été la rente 
espagnole extérieure 3% depuis transformée en 4%; puis sont venues les rentes autrichiennes 4% or, la 
rente hongroise 6% or” page 6. On the United States, see Wilkins (1989), p. 619, “  Often sovereign 
investors insisted on gold clauses in railroad bonds. They wanted ‘sound money’ in America and 
worldwide. The US adherence to a gold standard (after 1879) was in part a consequence of America’s 
desire to attract such investment ” 
28  Blanchard and Missale (1990).   33
FIGURE 5: TOTAL INDEBTEDNESS AND CURRENCY MISMATCH: AUSTRIA, HUNGARY, 










































Source: Crédit Lyonnais Archives as adapted by the authors. 
 
A final possibility rests in the motivations of international bankers whose syndicates 
arranged the loans. Because the bankers offered a number of services to cash strapped 
government in periods of crises, lending into arrears and helping them to muddle through 
financial trouble, they were also in a position to impose a lot of conditionality (Flandreau 
2000). This asymmetry was often emphasized by contemporary observers: according to 
Lévy (1901) “the creation of debts denominated in the currency of the lending country 
can be understood as resulting from the fact that it is the lending country that dictates its 
conditions to the borrowing part”.
29 It must be that the bankers expected that the bonds 
they were prepared to guarantee would face a deeper and more willing demand as a result   34
of the gold clauses, and they thus persuaded borrowers to issue their securities with fixed 
exchange rate clauses that tied the coupon to the unit of the market where the bonds were 
sold.
30 But then we are back to the question -- why shouldn’t the regular investor be 
willing to hold paper debts, provided he gets a return for it? 
In any case, given the situation, the fixed exchange rate clauses drew a sharp line 
between those members of the core where there had been a long record of adherence to a 
convertible standard and those who did not. As one leading financial economist of the 
time explained, robust gold convertibility was an acceptable substitute for the gold 
clauses: “when it comes to the bonds of countries where the gold standard prevails, such 
as Britain, Sweden, Norway, Denmark or Canada, special clauses are not necessary, since 
the obligation to pay in gold results from the fact that bonds are denominated in the 
currency of that country”
31  
This was certainly a reason why a number of countries became quite interested in trying 
to find ways to stabilize their currency in terms of gold. Yet the gold standard was 
definitely not a perfect substitute for gold clauses, since the club of countries that could 
issue abroad debts denominated in their own currency was much more selective than the 
gold club, as illustrated in Table 5 which shows the list of “senior” sovereigns in 
London
32. This data comes from Burdett’s Official Stock Exchange Intelligence. Table 5 
                                                                                                                                                 
29 Lévy, (1901) page 6. 
30 . The fixed exchange rate clause could come in various ways : either by denominating the currency in the 
foreign currency, by denominating it in a gold or silver domestic unit that thus had a fixed exchange rate 
with foreign gold or silver units, or by stating the fixed exchange rate at which the coupon would be paid to 
foreigners regardless of the actual exchange rate against paper money. From an economic point of view all 
these are equivalent. 
31 Lévy, (1901) page 6. 
32 The countries that could issue sovereign bonds in terms of their own currencies during the period 1880 – 
1914 were: US, UK, France, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark and Switzerland. Two additional 
countries included in the table which listed sovereign debt in their own currency were Austria, Hungary and   35
lists the bonds with various characteristics, including the currency in which it was issued 
and the currency in which the coupon was payable for ten major countries, eight of which 
issued bonds in their own currencies without fixed exchange rate clauses.
33 Other 











                                                                                                                                                 
Italy. However there is ample evidence to suggest that these bonds bore gold clauses. See Tattara (1999) 
and Flandreau (2001). 
33 For the U.S., Table 5 shows 3 bonds listed as payable in gold coin for the years 1895, 1898 and 1900. 
The previous bonds shown are listed as " payable in the coin standard of the United States.” The changed 
status was a response to the silver uncertainty of the 1890s, to remove any ambiguity over which metallic 
coin was the standard.  See Wilkins (1989) and Laughlin (1903). 












The borderline members of the list – i.e. those for which the currency denomination 
was ambiguous provides interesting evidence that the mere stabilization of the currency 
in terms of gold was not enough. As can be seen, Austria-Hungary’s position is 
ambiguous. And as a matter of fact, we found in separate French sources an interpretation 
of this problem: in the early 1890s, this country sought to stabilize its currency and 
defined a new unit, the crown, with a fixed gold parity. At first, market participants 
understood that since the crown "only exists as gold unit, and there are no paper crowns" 
a crown denominated debt had to be understood as a gold debt with an exchange rate 
“worth FF 1.05".
35 However, once the Austro-Hungarian currency was stabilized, and the 
crown became in 1900 the actual unit of account, it was realized that Austria’s and 
Hungary’s crowns debts were “without fixed parities in terms of foreign currencies, 
[because] Austria's monetary regime is a paper regime. In the event of a crisis, the value 
of the Austrian crown might experience depreciation."
36 This shows that having a gold 
parity that was credible over the short run was not a perfect substitute for a very long-
term commitment to exchange rate stability. 
Having a large gold debt and experiencing an exchange rate crisis could have 
devastating consequences. When a country embarked on a spending spree and public debt 
increased, the share of gold denominated debt increased in its turn. This created an 
explosive mismatch. The crises of the early 1890s – very much like those of the 1990s - 
provided evidence of the mechanism at work. Argentina opened the dance: there, the 
expansion of the gold debt (cedulas), accompanied by paper money issue, pushed the 
                                                 
35  Crédit Lyonnais Archives, date 1893. 
36  Crédit Lyonnais Archives, the date of this statement, certainly not incidentally, is 1 May 1914.   
40 
 
level of the debt burden to unsustainable heights.
37 The interruption of capital exports that 
resulted increased the needs of a number of financially weak peripheral countries whose 
currencies depreciated in turn. As argued in Flandreau [2000] the public debt crises in 
Portugal and Greece (in 1892 and 1893 respectively) both resulted from the depreciation 
of the exchange rate that had brought these countries’ public debts to unsustainable 
levels.     
The responses to these problems induced by high debts and financial vulnerability were 
also surprisingly modern. Some countries, such as Spain or Portugal, continued to float 
but minimized their exposure by limiting their borrowings abroad. Some others, such as 
Russia or Greece developed de facto currency boards. They accumulated gold reserves 
beyond what was statutorily necessary and in effect adopted stabilization cover ratios that 
were consistently above 100%. Yesterday like today, the response to financial 
vulnerability has been either a float with reduced exposure to the foreign capital market, 
or super-strong pegs.  “Hollowing out” is a very old thing. 
This discussion should shed a new light on the abundant quotes which one finds in the 
old literature regarding the importance of the gold standard as a way to foster integration 
and which have so often been analyzed in the recent literature as evidence of the 
“ideology” or “spirit” of the time.
38 There might in fact have been a lot more economic 
motivations behind these recommendations than is commonly acknowledged. Clearly, in 
view of the narrow list of countries that were able to float debts in their own currency, 
much of the “emerging world” was bound to face problematic currency mismatches.
39  
                                                 
37 . See e.g. Eichengreen (1997). 
38 . See e.g. Gallarotti (1994), Eichengreen and Temin (1998). 
39 . This was likely to become a serious problem for governments in the periphery, given the role which 
government undertakings had in the process of catching up in the late 19
th century (Gerschenkron 1960).  
41 
 
   From this point of view, gold adherence became for those willing to protect themselves 
against international financial disturbances a second best solution. It is not that a gold 
standard immediately bought credibility. Rather, it served as an insurance mechanism and 
in this sense fostered globalization. In other words, the spread of the gold standard in the 
periphery was an endogenous response to the gold clauses: as soon as the price of this 
insurance decreased (as was the case during the gold inflation of 1896-1914), the gold 
standard expanded, as more and more countries found it less dangerous to borrow with 
gold clauses since the risk of being tipped off gold declined.
40 
 
3.4 Exchange rate regimes and the financial maturity hypothesis 
 
A consequence of the analysis developed here is that logically, pre-1914 core 
countries that had developed strong money and financial markets before WWI and were 
thus able to issue foreign debts in their own currency, ought to have floated – something 
which they did not. At first sight, this seems to be a serious challenge to our view and 
may require a word of explanation. However, the evidence reported above, that core 
countries pioneered the use of exchange rate adjustments within the gold points in a 
Target Zone fashion suggests that core countries were nonetheless exploiting to the 
fullest possible extent whatever flexibility they had. In a sense, the seeds of a floating 
exchange rate system were sown at the center.  
                                                 
40 . This explanation is not a mutually exclusive one. An alternative reason why periphery countries may 
have favored gold standard adherence is that the gold standard served as a ‘good housekeeping seal of 
approval’ – a signal to lenders in the core that peripheral countries followed sound financial policies. See 
Bordo and Rockoff (1996) for evidence that sovereign debt spreads on London were lower for emerging 
countries that adhered strongly to gold relative to those whose adherence was less conscientious and those 
on paper standards. Also see Obstfeld and Taylor (2001). Flandreau, LeCacheux and Zumer (1998) stress  
42 
 
The question still arises why did advanced countries before 1914 that were financially 
mature not float as advanced countries do today. Possible answers include the protection 
that gold gave to bond holders against inflation risk and the path dependency of gold as 
money. 
Indeed historians have emphasized that the rise of a large and liquid market for 
government debt in the 18
th and 19
th century has been the hallmark of financial 
development. But this meant that at the beginning of the process, domestic residents 
saving for their retirement had their money mostly in the fixed income portion of the 
market and would take a beating if governments inflated away.
41 Thus the response, as in 
the well-known British case, was to develop powerful parliaments that took the power 
over money out of the hands of sovereigns, and linked the domestic unit to a weight of 
gold. But once this was done, this created strong constituencies that resisted the 
devaluation of the unit in terms of gold.  
This domestic mechanism was supplemented by an international one, since in practice 
no single country could easily take the lead and move away from the system and widen 
the fluctuation bands, without raising the suspicion that it truly wanted to depreciate. In 
the end, core countries were locked onto gold and peripheral countries either had to float 
or to lock onto core countries. To give way, the gold standard needed some easily 
identifiable external shock such as World War I. It took another six decades for a 
universal floating exchange rate system based on a credible domestic nominal anchor to 
                                                                                                                                                 
the role of gold inflation after 1896 as reducing the burdens of public debt for European peripheral 
countries and hence making their adherence to the gold standard more sustainable.  
41 In today’s world where price indices are systematically constructed by generally careful institutions, and 
are thus fairly consensual, the issue of determining the reasons why governments scarcely issue indexed 
bonds might be addressed (see however the mid-1990s controversies on the inflation measurement problem 




be established (although earlier successful efforts prevailed in the U.K. and Sweden in 
the 1930’s and in Canada in the 1950’s).
42 
 The history of the international monetary system for the advanced countries in the 
twentieth century has been well documented (Bordo and Schwartz 1999, Redish 1996, 
Eichengreen 1996). The path dependency of gold seen in adherence to some form of gold 
convertibility prevailed until 1971. The golden nominal anchor was stretched with the use 
of international reserves in the inter-war exchange standard and even more under the 
Bretton Woods system, while monetary policies became increasingly geared towards 
domestic goals.
43 Ultimately the gold-based system became unworkable and collapsed in 
1971. The full shift to a credible domestic nominal anchor and floating exchange rates in 
the 1970s and 1980s required the development of deep and mature financial markets 
discussed here and in Rousseau and Sylla (2001) as well as the adoption of monetary 
rules that in many ways echoed the functions of the gold standard convertibility rule. 
   Thus today by contrast, the more financially developed part of the world has finally 
been able to exploit to its fullest possible extent its ability to float. As a matter of fact, the 
generalization today of floating in the developed countries virtually encompasses the list 
of countries that can issue international securities in their own currency as we discuss in 
section 4 below. 
 
                                                 
42 The case for generalized floating was made clearly by Gottfried Haberler in the 1930s but was rejected 
by the consensus view of the time that floating was destabilizing. see Bordo and James ( 2001) 
43  According to Bordo and Eichengreen (1998), had the Great Depression not intervened, the gold 
exchange standard would have prevailed until the late 1950s.  
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Section 4. Financial Depth and the Exchange Rate Regime 
The interpretation of the seemingly opposite nature of global exchange rate regimes in 
the two big eras of globalization (fixed exchange rates back then, floating ones today) has 
put at the center of the picture the role of financial vulnerability and financial crises. To 
some extent, the Baring crisis yesterday played a role similar to the crises of the late 
1990s in reminding floaters about the dangers of an impervious flexible exchange rate. 
As a result, while developed countries have always had the temptation and ability to float 
(with floating restricted yesterday by path dependency and the difficulty of creating 
domestic institutions that could create a domestic nominal anchor) the periphery has 
always faced serious difficulties in floating, viewing the gold standard yesterday, and 
hard pegs today, as a second best solution. 
The change in the dominant form of regime has implications as to where we should 
find greater financial depth: in the pre 1914 era when the gold standard was the dominant 
monetary arrangement, we would expect countries adhering to gold to have greater 
financial depth than those that did not. In the post 1973 period where floating is the 
dominant regime, we would expect by contrast that countries that can successfully 
operate pure floats would also be more financially developed than those which could not. 
However, those emerging countries which could not, or for other reasons such as 
considerable openness or close trading linkages to a large country, choose not to float and 
instead adhered to hard pegs e.g. Hong Kong and Singapore, would also have greater 
financial depth than countries following intermediate regimes.  
In this section we seek to investigate this prediction by looking at the record of both 
the periods 1880-1914 and 1973-1997, by attempting to identify the effects of alternative  
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exchange rate regimes on financial depth, which we proxy before 1914 by the ratio of a 
broad monetary aggregate (M2) to GDP, post 1973 by similar variables plus other 
broader measures, to be discussed below. These variables can in turn be viewed as 
indicators of a set of factors which come under the rubric of financial maturity.
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4.1. The Classical Gold Standard, 1880-1913 
Because of its biblical simplicity, the 1880-1913 period is an ideal testing ground for 
our hypothesis that the “dominant” exchange rate regime, by which we mean the more 
technically advanced, is associated with greater financial sophistication. Case studies of 
financial development in the nineteenth century have emphasized that those countries 
which adhered to gold in the 1880s, 1890’s and 1900’s such as France, Britain, and 
Germany were also the more financially developed. This cross section evidence is 
supplemented by time series analysis such as in Gregory (1995) and Komlos (1987) 
according to whom, the Russian, Austro-Hungarian stabilizations in the 1890s were both 
associated with a considerable expansion of the monetary base. In line with these earlier 
studies, we believe that the expansion of real broad money would be a good proxy for 
financial depth before 1914 because this was an era in which monetization (the spread of 
the money economy) proliferated across the world, as did the growth of banking systems 
(Bordo  and Jonung 1987). 
                                                 
44 Rousseau and Sylla (2001) list five attributes of a good financial system which overlaps our meaning of 
financial maturity; sound public finance and debt management; stable money; a sound banking system; a 
central bank to act as a lender of last resort and to manage international financial arrangements; a well 
functioning securities market. They employ the same measure of financial depth we do as both a 
determinant of economic growth and as a determinant of international financial integration.  
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To test systematically for the link between the exchange rate regime and financial 
development, we assembled a panel of data for 23 countries 1880-1913.
45 The panel 
includes both advanced (core) and less developed (periphery) countries.
46 The strategy 
followed is to run panel regressions of the log of M/Y (money to income ratio) on a 
number of controls to see whether a dummy capturing the years in which a country 
adhered to gold or did not, and another one capturing whether a country had international 
sovereign bonds listed in terms of its own currency on the London Stock Exchange in 
1913 had positive and significant effects.
47 
48 Other things equal we would expect that 
our measures of financial depth would be higher under the gold standard than under paper 
money, and for a country that can issue foreign bonds denominated in its own currency 
than for another that cannot. 
To test this, it is necessary to control for other effects. The first is per capita real 
income. From the literature on money demand, other things equal, we would expect the 
elasticity of M/Y with respect to real per capita income to be zero (Friedman 1959).
49 
However in the situation where money balances are a luxury good and the income 
elasticity of money demand is greater than one as evidenced in Friedman (1959) and 
Bordo and Jonung (1987) for a number of our countries for the pre 1914 period, then real 
                                                 
45 The data sources are listed in the Data appendix. 
46 The advanced countries, demarcated both by income and by the fact that they were capital exporters 
(with the principal exception of the U.S. before 1900) were: Belgium, France, Germany, Netherlands, 
United Kingdom, United States and Switzerland. The emergers were: Argentina, Australia, Austria – 
Hungary, Brazil, Canada, Denmark, Chile, Finland, Greece, Italy, Japan, Norway, Portugal, Russia, Spain 
and Sweden. 
47 Gold Standard adherence dates come from Bordo and Schwartz (1996), Eichengreen and Flandreau 
(1996). We did not distinguish between countries that left and returned to gold at the same parities and 
those that altered their parities. The domestic currency bond dummy is derived from information in Table 
5.  
48 We also ran the regressions using the log of real per capita money balances as our measure of financial 
depth. This of course is the traditional measure of demand for money. The results are very similar to the 
ones we report below.    
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income per capita would be positively associated with our measure of financial depth. 
Thus we would expect countries with high per capita income pre 1914 to have greater 
financial depth. Such countries would also more likely be on the gold standard and would 
be able to issue bonds in terms of their own currencies. 
Figure 6 presents a scatter plot of M/Y and real per capita income showing this 
relationship nicely.
50 In the left-hand corner we see mainly paper currency countries with 
low financial depth who borrowed abroad in sterling or who had gold clauses. In the 
upper right hand corner we observe high income countries with high M/Y who were on 
gold and could issue bonds in their own currency, with the anomalies being easily 
explained.
51 Similar figures for 1880-1896 and 1897-1914 (not shown) nicely trace out 
the transition from paper to gold by a large number of emerging countries as their 










                                                                                                                                                 
49 . Real per capita income was expressed in 1913 US dollars. The PPP adjusted data is from Maddison 
(1995). We also tried the unadjusted data in the regressions below.  
50 A similar pattern is observed comparing real per capita cash balances and real per capita income. 
51 Belgium and Netherlands with high per capita income but low financial depth. This reflects the fact that 
broad money data is unavailable for these countries before 1913 and we had to use M1. 
52 See Eichengreen and Flandreau (1996) for other factors explaining the transition.  
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Figure 6: M2/GDP and Real Per Capita GDP (exchange rate regime, debt currency 
denomination), 1880 – 1913 
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As controls in the regression we used the traditional determinants of the demand for 
money: real per capita income (discussed above) and a short-term interest rate. We would 
expect the short term interest rate, representing the opportunity cost of holding money 
balances, as well as the presence and spread of financial assets as substitutes for money, 
to be negative.
53 Other controls tried in the regressions (but not presented in the results 
below) were: the (log of the) CPI inflation rate, to measure the opportunity cost of  
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holding money relative to goods, the fiscal balance since a tendency to run a deficit might 
signal eventual attempts to predate the financial sector, thus causing, in line with our 
earlier discussion, a persistence of domestic financial underdevelopment as people 
continue to hold their balances abroad. 
Table 6 shows log linear panel regressions for 23 countries for M2/GDP including 
country (fixed effects) and a time trend. In column 1 the gold adherence dummy is 
significantly associated with a higher M2/GDP. Going from paper to gold is associated 
with a 21% higher M2/GDP (the response indicated in brackets)
54. Countries that could 
issue sovereign debt in terms of their own currencies also had higher ratios of M2/GDP 
by 26% (column 2). The addition of real per capita income and short term interest rates to 
the regression with the gold dummy (column 3) shows significant coefficients for all 
regressors with signs suggested by theory, the positive and greater than one coefficient on 
real per capita income agrees with earlier evidence in Bordo and Jonung (1987). Finally, 















                                                                                                                                                 
53 For the short term interest rate in most countries we used the official discount rate. For the core countries 
(US, UK, France, Germany and Netherlands) we used open market rates. For several countries where data 
on short-term interest rates is unavailable we used long-term interest rates. 
54Calculated as in Halverson and Palmquist (1980).  
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Table 6. Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Effects 1880 - 1913, 23 
Countries. 
 
Dependent Variable  log M2/GDP [response %] 
                
Independent Variables  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                
Gold Standard  0.082  [20.8]      0.102  [26.6]  0.099  [25.5] 
  (5.134)        (5.686)    (5.409)   
Domestic Currency Bonds      0.102  [26.4]      0.083  [21.1] 
      (4.632)        (3.833)   
Real per Capita GDP(log)          0.266    0.263   
          (4.753)    (4.684)   
Short term  Interest rate(log)          -0.089    -0.089   
         (-3.780)    (-3.887)   
                
Number of observations  782    782    782    782  
 
GLS with cross section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t values in parentheses.  
 
   In sum, these results suggest that countries that could adhere to gold were financially 
more developed. Also financially developed countries were those that could issue 




In this section, we conduct similar exercises for the current regime of open capital 
markets and generalized floating. Our assumption is that today, as in the previous era of 
                                                 
55 As a sensitivity test, we ran a panel probit regression taking the choice of exchange rate (adherence to 
gold or not) as the dependent variable and M2/GDP and the other controls from Table 6 as the independent 
variables. In the regressions the M2/GDP ratio was positive and significant but the bond dummy was 
insignificant. The coefficient on M2/GDP suggests that a one percent increase in financial depth would 
increase the probability of a country adhering to gold by 6.5 %.  This result compared to the coefficient of 
the exchange rate variable shown in the regressions in Table 6, raises the tricky issue of causality between 
financial depth and the exchange rate regime. 
    On the one hand Rousseau and Sylla’s  (2001) evidence that financial development is a key determinant 
of the earlier growth of today’s advanced countries and Eichengreen and Flandreau’s (1996) findings that 
growth is a determinant of gold standard adherence pre 1914 suggests that financial development may 
explain the ability to adhere to gold. On the other hand, adherence to the specie standard in Europe long 
predated modern growth and England’s switch to gold de facto in 1717 also preceded both modern 
economic growth and much of England’s financial development. Thus arguments for causality between the 
exchange rate regime and financial depth can go both ways.  
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globalized financial markets, we would expect that advanced countries would have 
greater financial depth than emerging ones and (ceteris paribus) would float. Moreover, 
as emerging countries moved toward advanced country status they would adopt the 
monetary regime of the advanced countries. Thus we would expect to find that, across 
both advanced and emerging countries, financial depth would be positively associated 
with adherence to freely floating regimes relative to adherence to other regimes. 
A number of reasons however suggest that the clean results we reported in the 
previous section might not be so easy to replicate in today’s world. And since these affect 
the regression strategy it seems necessary to spend a while discussing them. One is that 
the expansion of the real broad money supply might not be as good a measure for today 
as it was for the late 19
th century. Especially for the advanced countries because of the 
development of other financial assets as substitutes for money balances, as well as 
technological innovation which economizes on cash balances.
56 
 A second is that the simple menu of alternatives to floating that prevailed in the late 
19
th century (peg to gold) has been replaced by a more complex one: peg to the dollar, 
peg to the mark, peg to the euro, peg to a basket, not to mention various intermediate 
arrangements ranging from dirty floats, adjustable pegs to crawling pegs. These latter 
arrangements purport to maintain some of the advantages of floating – monetary 
independence and insulation from external shocks—with the advantages of pegging.  
A third one is, that as a number of recent papers have argued, that the IMF 
classification of exchange rate regimes, which is based on information provided by the 
member countries may not reflect the true underlying regime. Thus Calvo and Reinhart 
                                                 
56 Thus velocity (the inverse of M2/GDP) displays a U-shaped pattern over the past century and across 
countries by levels of development. Bordo and Jonung (1987).  
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(2000a, 2000b) present evidence to the effect that countries which say they are floating 
show little variation in their exchange rates but substantial variation in their international 
reserves and interest rates and hence act more like peggers. 
What we argue here is that the dose of “19
th centurism” which according to us has 
survived in the periphery, implies that for those emerging countries which are unable to 
successfully float because a substantial portion of their outstanding financial obligations 
are denominated in dollars or other advanced countries currencies, pegging would mean 
financial deepening – in a 19
th century fashion. This follows because the alternative of 
volatile exchange rates could have serious consequences for the private sector’s balance 
sheet and hence for the real economy—manifest by their inability to sell their debt 
denominated in their own currency in international markets— these countries would be 
better off, it is argued if they dollarized.  
 For these emerging markets, especially those of Latin America, Haussmann, Panizza 
and Stein (2000) argue that greater financial depth would be associated with fixed 
exchange rate arrangements (i.e. to peg as second best)
57. Thus we may expect to see a 
bi-polar pattern where advanced countries and some emergers that can emulate them have 
greater financial depth associated with floating and others who can not float, or because 
of their greater openness choose not to, have greater depth associated with fixing. 
In our empirical work, we use a panel of 44 countries with data from Bordo, 
Eichengreen, Klingebiel and Martinez-Peria (2001): 22 advanced countries and 22 
emerging countries
58. Exchange rate regimes are identified with dummies constructed 
                                                 
57 Also see Eichengreen and Haussman (1999). 
58 The 22 advanced countries are: Australia, Austria-Hungary, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, 
France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, 
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, USA. The 22 emerging countries are: Argentina, Brazil, Chile, China,  
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using the two exchange rate definitions discussed in section 2 (Masson (2001) and LYS 
(2001)). To measure financial depth, as we did for the 1880-1913 period, we used the 
M2/GDP ratio. However as argued above we might expect that this measure may not be 
as good a proxy for financial depth today as it was a century ago. As alternative measures 
of financial depth we use 3 measures developed for the World Bank by Beck, Demirguc- 
Kunt and Levine (1999): FD1, defined as the ratio of private credit to GDP; FD2 defined 
as private credit plus stock market valuation to GDP; and FD3 defined as FD2 plus 
private and public bond market capitalization as a share of GDP.
59 
To account for the domestic currency denomination of international bonds we 
used two databases. The first is the BIS data used by Haussmann, Pannizza and Stein 
(2000) which contains all international securities and bank loans by currency and issuer 
but only for the period 1993-1997. Countries that issued international securities in terms 
of their own currency consisted of most of the OECD countries and in our sample only 4 
emergers: Hong Kong, Singapore, South Africa and Taiwan. . The second measure is all 
international bonds from data supplied by the IMF. This data covers the period 1980-
1997 and again consists mostly of OECD countries plus 7 emergers: Argentina, China, 
Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Philippines and South Africa. We defined a dummy as 
equal to one if a country could issue such securities
60. 
Finally, as in the 1880-1913 period, we used as controls in the regression: per 
capita real GDP in U.S. dollars, short-term interest rates (open market rates where 
                                                                                                                                                 
Colombia, Ecuador, Hong Kong, Indonesia, Israel, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, 
Singapore, South Africa, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
59 See Khan et al (2001) for an earlier use of these measures to explain the pattern of growth across 
emerging countries. 
60 The dummy starts the year  that the listings begin.  
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available, otherwise deposit rates), the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio and the log of the CPI 
inflation rate. All this data comes from IFS. 
 
4.3. Results: All Advanced and Emerging Countries 
We present tables similar to those for the pre 1914 period. Table 7 shows the 
coefficients of regressions of the log of M2/GDP on the Masson and LYS floating 
exchange rate dummies, a dummy for the IMF indicator of the issue of international 






Table 7. Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Effects 1973 - 1997, All Countries. 
 
            
Dependent Variable log M2/GDP [response %] 
 
  All countries  Advanced Countries  Emerging Countries 
Independent Variables  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
     (a)       (a)       (a)   
Masson Float  0.094  [24.1]      0.108  [28.1]      0.070  [17.5]     
  (3.614)        (3.433)        (1.677)       
Levy-Yeyati-
Sturzenegger Float 
    0.020  [4.8]      0.031  [7.4]      0.021  [5.1] 
      (2.010)        (1.987)        (1.592)   
Domestic Currency 
Bonds 
0.081  [20.5]  0.087  [22.3]  -0.024  [-5.4]  0.059  [14.7]  0.184  [52.6]  0.456  [186] 
  (6.424)    (5.101)    (-1.539)    (3.167)    (5.251)    (4.199)   
Short-term Interest 
rate(log) 
-0.067    -0.074   -0.060    -0.049   -0.064   -0.093  
 (-6.933)    (-7.048)   (-5.153)    (-3.433)   (-4.294)   (-5.952)  
                   
Number  of  observations  1025   1008    500   504    525    504  
 
GLS with cross section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t values in parentheses.  
(a)  we used the BIS bond dummy. 
 
                                                 
61 We also used the BIS measure of Bonds issued in domestic currency. The results were usually similar so 
because the data for these bonds only covers 5 years we do not report them unless otherwise indicated. 
62 As an alternative to the log of short-term interest rates we use the log of the inflation rate. The results 
using this variable were almost identical to those using the log of interest rates, so we do not report them 
here. We also do not report results for regressions including the fiscal deficit to GDP ratio. That ratio was 
often insignificant.  
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As in the 1880-1913 regressions we include country fixed effects and a time trend. We 
exclude real per capita income from the regressions shown because the estimated income 
elasticity was close to zero (the income elasticity with respect to real cash balances close 
to one). Indeed the specification of the M2/GDP ratio we present is similar to the one first 
used by Latane (1954) and by Lucas (1988). 
    In Table 7 we present the results for all countries and then separately for advanced and 
emerging countries. As can be seen in column (1) and (2) for all countries, all three 
independent variables are significant. Financial depth increases on average when 
countries float according to the Masson definition by 24%, for the LYS by 5%. When 
they can issue bonds in terms of their own currencies financial depth increases by slightly 
over 20% 
63.  
     For the advanced countries, (see columns (3) and (4)) as in the case of all countries, 
both floating exchange rate indicators are positive and significant as is the bond variable 
in column (4).
64 For the emerging countries (see columns (5) and (6)), the Masson 
dummy is positive and significant at conventional levels whereas the LYS dummy is 
barely significant at the 10% level. Also the bond variable is significant and positive in 
both specifications. 
We then ran similar regressions to those in the above tables but we substituted the 
Masson and LYS fixed exchange rate dummies instead of the floats used in Table 7.  See 
Table 8. For all countries both fixed exchange rate dummies were significant and 
negative in a regression including the bond dummy and the interest rate. 
 
                                                 
63 In the regressions in column 2 we used the BIS measure of local currency bonds because the IMF 
measure was not significant  
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Table 8. Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Effects 1973 - 1997. 
 
Dependent Variable log M2/GDP [response %] 
 
                       
 All        Advanced        Emerging       
Independent Variables  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (6)   
             (a)           
Masson Fixed  -0.110  [-22.4]      -0.079  [-16.7]      -0.268  [-46.1]     
  (-3.959)        (-2.723)        (-2.802)       
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger 
Fixed 
    -0.039  [-8.6]      -0.026  [-5.8]      -0.018  [-4.0] 
      (-1.943)        (-
1.183) 
      (-0.601)  
Domestic Currency Bonds  0.074  [18.5]  0.098  [25.2]  -0.023  [-5.3]  0.055  [13.4]  0.206  [60.8]  0.178  [50.6] 
  (5.709)    (5.81)    (-1.503)    (2.886)    (5.792)    (4.982)  
Short term  Interest rate(log) -0.065    -0.111    -0.060    -0.049    -0.077    -0.081   
 (-6.807)    (-
11.696) 
  (-5.007)    (-
3.477) 
  (-5.351)    (-5.326)   
                        
Number of observations  1025    504    500   504    525   504   
 
GLS with cross section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t values in parentheses.  
 
(a) We used the BIS bond dummy 
 
The same result obtained for the advanced countries using the Masson dummy, 
with the LYS exchange rate indicator insignificant. Finally for the emerging countries, 
the Masson fixed exchange rate dummy was negative and significant in all the 
regressions, whereas the LYS dummy was always insignificant
65.  
In sum, the results from Tables 7 and 8 for the 1973 to 1997 period when floating 
was the dominant exchange rate regime, seem to be consistent with those of the pre 1914 
era in Table 6, when gold was the dominant regime. For advanced countries and to a 
lesser extent emerging countries, greater financial depth both as measured by M2/GDP 
                                                                                                                                                 
64 Again in column 4 we used the BIS bond dummy. 
65 As for the pre 1914 sample we also reran the regressions above as panel probits with the exchange rate 
regime dummies as dependent variable. Taking the floating exchange rates as dependent variables we 
found that M2/GDP was generally positive and significant for all the country classifications using both the 
Masson and LYS indicators. Similar results obtained for the bond dummies. Taking the fixed exchange rate 
regime as dependent variable, M2/GDP was generally negative and the bond dummy was insignificant. As 
was the case for the pre 1914 period gold standard, the question of causality between financial depth and 





and the ability to issue international bonds in domestic currency is associated with 
floating. 
 
4.4. Latin America and Asia 
The results from Table 8 for a sample of emergers across the world suggest that 
hard fixers on average had lower financial depth than others. These results seems to 
contradict evidence presented in Haussmann, Panizza and Stein (2000) for Latin America 
suggesting that fixers had greater financial depth. However they may also be explained 
by the fact that emergers who could float were less financially integrated than the 
advanced countries as seen in section 2, and by the aggregation of very different 
categories of emerging countries 
     To correct for this, in Table 9 we split the emerging sample of countries into Latin 
America and Asia, presenting only the significant results. For Latin America we find that 
the Masson float dummy is positive and significant when introduced alone (but is 
insignificant with the addition of the interest rate control), whereas the LYS floating 
dummy is negative and significant in the regressions with controls. At the same time the 
Masson fixed exchange rate dummy is negative and significant. Both bond dummies for 









Table 9. Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Effects 1973 – 1997 
 
(a) Latin America 
 
Dependent Variable log M2/GDP [response %] 
 
              
Independent Variables  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
              
Masson Float  0.129  [34.5]           
  (2.700)          
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Float        -0.09  [-18]    
          (-2.044)    
Masson Fixed    -0.198  [-37]     -0.43  [-63] 
    (-3.811)     (-2.005) 
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Fixed           
               
Domestic  
Currency Bonds 
            
              
Short term  Interest rate(log)        -0.06    -0.098   
         (-4.975) (-4.812) 
              




Dependent Variable log M2/GDP [response %] 
 
                  
Independent Variables  (5)    (6)    (7)    (8)    (9)   
                    
Masson Float     0.15  [43]             
     (3.009)            
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Float        0.08  [19]  0.05  [11]    
          (2.700)    (1.735)      
Masson Fixed                    
                  
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Fixed                0.06  [15] 
                (1.759)   
Domestic Currency Bonds  0.22  [66]         0.18  [53]  0.11  [29] 
  (6.443)           (5.140)    (3.094)   
Short term  Interest rate(log)              -0.05    -0.02   
              (-1.848) (-0.792)  
                    
Number of observations  264    300   288   264   264   
 
GLS with cross section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t values in parentheses.  
 
 
The LYS results that Latin American countries that float do not have greater 
financial depth may be consistent with the evidence from the Feldstein-Horioka   
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regressions in section 2 that Latin America is relatively financially open. The LYS 
results, which are based on the economic characteristics of the regime, rather than on 
information supplied by the reporting countries that lie behind the Masson dummies, may 
be more telling. 
For Asia, we find both floating indicators to be associated with greater financial 
depth, as is the domestic currency bond indicator, evidence that some Asian countries 
may be able to emulate the advanced countries. However the evidence from section 2 that 
financial integration in Asia is less than in Latin America may also explain why some 
Asian countries could successfully float. At the same time the LYS fixed exchange rate 
dummy is also positive and significant in column 9. This last result seems consistent with 
the ‘hollowing out’ hypothesis.  
    In sum, for the emergers, the case is mixed. Although there is some evidence for the 
group as a whole that floating was associated with greater financial depth and the ability 
to issue bonds denominated in domestic currency, we also find that when we disaggregate 
the emerging countries into Latin America and Asia that, although some Latin American 
countries may have had deeper financial markets associated with floating, there was quite 
strong evidence that Asian countries with floating exchange rates had greater financial 
depth than other countries, and moreover they seem to be more mature than their Latin 
counterparts in terms of the ability to issue international bonds denominated in their own 
currency (although again they may have been able to achieve this because they were less 
open than other countries). The evidence at the same time that some Asian countries with 
fixed rates had greater financial depth is consistent with both the ‘hollowing out’ and 
‘original sin’ hypotheses.   
60 
 
 4.5. An Alternative Measure of Financial Development  
          Finally, we experimented with regressions similar to those displayed in sections 4.3 
and 4.4 but taking as dependent variable the alternative measures of financial 
development produced by the World Bank: FD1 (Private Credit to GDP); FD2 (Private 
Credit plus Stock Market Valuation to GDP) and FD3 (FD2 plus bond market 
capitalization to GDP).  
The most significant results were for FD2 and FD3, which were quite similar. We 
show selected results taking the log of FD3 as dependent variable for advanced, 
emerging, Latin America and Asia in Table 10. The results for the advanced countries are 
almost identical to those in Table 7. For advanced countries greater financial depth is 
associated positively and significantly with floating and the ability to issue securities in 
domestic currency. This evidence may be important since these measures of financial 
development, unlike M2/GDP, account for the substitution away from money once an 










                                                 
66 This substitution process may also explain the positive coefficient on the short-term interest rate for the 





Table 10. Panel Estimates: Regressions with Fixed Effects 1973 - 1997. 
 
 
Dependent Variable log FD3 [response %] 
 
 Advanced  Emerging  Latin  America  Asia 
Independent Variables  (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)    (5)    (5)   
     (a)                  
Masson Float  0.128  [34.4]                 
  (3.69
7) 
                  
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Float  0.025  [6.0]              
      (1.634)               
Masson Fixed        0.200  [58.5]    0.546  [251.3]    
        (3.41)      (4.145)      
Levy-Yeyati-Sturzenegger Fixed           0.271  [86.7]    0.344  [120.6
] 
             (4.725)       (4.619)   




  (2.304)              (-3.737)   
Short term  Interest rate(log)  0.072    0.025       -0.025       -0.010   
 (3.61
5) 
  (1.748)       (-1.45)      (-2.900)   
                     
Number  of  observations  440   440   462   462   210    242   
 
GLS with cross section weights; country dummies, and a time trend (not shown in the table); t values in parentheses.  
 
(a)  We used the BIS bond dummy. 
 
 
For the emerging countries the evidence unequivocally suggests that greater 
financial depth is associated with fixed exchange rates. In addition to the fixed exchange 
rate results presented here, the various floating exchange rate indicators are negative. 
Similar evidence obtains for both Latin America and Asia. Also of interest, the bond 




67. These results seem much more in accord with Haussmann’s original 
sin hypothesis.  
The question then arises which measure of financial depth should we pay more 
attention to: M2/GDP or FD3?  For the advanced countries the broader measure should 
surely be superior to M2/GDP but this may not be the case for the emergers because the 
stock and bond markets in these countries may still be in a nascent state at least compared 
to the advanced countries. 
4.6. Summary  
In conclusion, the evidence presented in this section for the two eras of globalization 
suggests some remarkable similarities. In general countries with greater financial 
development followed the dominant regime—gold pre 1914,floating post 1973. Also 
countries that issued international bonds in terms of their own currencies could 
successfully follow the dominant regime. The exchange rate experience of the advanced 
countries exactly fits this pattern.  
The case of the emerging countries is however less clear. Before 1914 emergers went 
to great lengths to join the gold standard and the financial performance of those who 
couldn’t adhere was clearly worse. Today the incidence of emergers who float and who 
have greater financial depth is less than the pre 1914 incidence of emergers who adhered 
to gold. Those who can not float but need access to international capital according to the 
‘original sin’ theory must adhere to hard fixes.  
The evidence for the recent period is mixed on who has greater financial depth. 
According to the M2 /GDP results, it is floaters based on the Masson exchange rate 
                                                 
67 Panel probit regression of the exchange rate regime dummies on FD3 revealed a pattern of coefficients 
similar to that in Table 10, again raising the issue of causality.  
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indicator, although this is not evident from the LYS results which may be the more 
economically meaningful. But the FD3 (and FD2) results see hard fixers (especially those 
in Asia) as more financially developed. In addition the evidence for Asia which 
associates some countries floating experience with greater financial depth may also be 
reflecting the fact that Asia is less financially open than Latin America so that it may be 
capital controls (hidden or otherwise) that allows these regimes to be viable.  
Thus we conclude that our empirical results for the emerging countries today are in 
general consistent with both the ‘hollowing out’ and ‘original sin’ hypothesis. More 
research is clearly needed.  
 Finally an important fact that emerges from the evidence in this section is that the 
number of countries who could issue bonds in terms of their own currencies has not 
increased all that much over the past century. Before 1914, it was 8. Today, it is about 25. 
Virtually all of the expansion is by countries like Canada, Italy and Sweden who 
graduated to advanced status after World War I. There are very few emerging countries 
today in either of the lists of bonds that we had access to and most of them only entered 
in late in the past decade. The question as to how countries graduate from junior to senior 
country status in the bond markets is also  a subject for further research. 
 
Section 5. Conclusion: Financial Maturity: The Holy Grail 
 The traditional view is that fixed exchange rate regimes are best for the globalization 
of financial markets. This is based on the stellar performance of the classical gold 
standard. Yet today we are in another era of globalization as pervasive as the earlier one 
and now the dominant regime is floating. This paradox at first glance suggests that rather 




than the exchange rate regime determining the pace of globalization, it occurs 
independent of the exchange rate regime. However as we argue in this paper, although 
this may be the case for advanced countries, it is not for emergers whose regime choice is 
in large measure driven by international financial integration. 
In this paper we focus on the different historical regime experiences of the core and 
the periphery. Before 1914 advanced countries adhered to gold while periphery countries 
tried to emulate the core, especially when they were concerned with attracting foreign 
capital. Because of their extensive external debt obligations denominated in core country 
currencies, peripheral countries were especially vulnerable to financial crises and debt 
default. This made devaluations difficult for them, leaving them with the difficult choice 
of floating but restricting external borrowing or devoting considerable resources to 
maintaining an extra hard peg. Today while advanced countries can successfully float, 
emergers must also borrow abroad in terms of advanced country currencies, are afraid to 
float for the same reason as their twentieth century forbearers. To maintain access to 
foreign capital they may need a hard peg to the core country currencies. 
Thus the key distinction between core and periphery countries, both “then” and 
“now”, that we emphasize in this paper is financial maturity. It is evidenced in the ability 
to issue international securities denominated in domestic currency or what Ricardo 
Haussmann refers to as to as the absence of ‘original sin’. Indeed our hypothesis is that 
countries that are financially developed, in a world of open capital markets, should be 
able to float as advanced countries do today. Evidence for the core countries that the 
classical gold standard operated as a target zone with the gold points serving as bands in 
which credible floating could occur and external shocks be buffered is a presage of the  
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regime followed today. Today’s floating is a product of financial maturity and the 
development of the technological and institutional structures and constraints that allow 
policy makers to follow stable money and fiscal policy without adhering to an external 
nominal anchor. 
 We present several strands of evidence for our hypothesis that globalization is largely 
independent of the regime for advanced countries but drives the exchange rate regime for 
the periphery. First, evidence from Feldstein-Horioka tests over the period since 1880 
agrees with the ‘Folk’ wisdom that financial integration was high before 1914 as it is 
today. But the evidence suggests that it was not the exchange rate regime followed that 
mattered but the presence of capital controls. Moreover a comparison between advanced 
and emerging countries today suggests that while there is considerable financial 
integration among the advanced countries, most of whom can float, this is not the case for 
the emergers and indeed those that float may do so because they are not financially open. 
Second in section 3 we elaborate on the financial vulnerability hypothesis which is 
related to the recent literature on “original sin”. Descriptive material from the pre 1914 
history of the periphery paints a very familiar picture of financially “backward” countries 
required to borrow abroad in sterling, franc, marks, or with gold clauses, being hammered 
by the crises of the 1890s, forced to devalue and default and then devoting considerable 
resources to obtain the gold reserves needed to adhere to gold as if on a currency board 
(Russia, Greece) or floating but restricting foreign borrowing (Spain, Portugal) - - 
‘hollowing out’ déjà vu. Future research will have to explain the reasons for the inability 
which many countries have faced, and most probably will continue to face, when 
borrowing abroad.  
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Finally in section 4 we present some empirical findings for the pre 1914 period 
showing a clear connection between the ability to borrow abroad in domestic currency, 
gold adherence and financial depth. Extending our methodology to the post 1973 era led 
to identical results for the advanced countries whose dominant exchange rate regime is 
now floating (with the exception of the European experiment with a monetary union). 
For the emerging countries however it appears as if those that are financially open, 
especially the Latin American countries, have difficulty floating because they do suffer 
from “original sin” as evidenced in their inability to borrow abroad in domestic 
currencies. They tend to have greater financial depth when they have fixed rates. For 
Asia, floating exchange rates are associated with one measure of greater financial depth 
but this may be because they are less financially open. For another measure fixed rates 
and financial depth go hand in hand similar to the experiences of Latin America. 
In conclusion the dynamics of the international monetary system and the evolution of 
the exchange rate regime can be understood as a complex involving both the financial 
development of countries and international financial integration. Financial crises such as 
those in the 1890s and the 1990s are the defining moments that reveal the regime fault 
lines between advanced and emerging countries. The evolution from the gold standard to 
floating by the advanced countries required achieving financial maturity, the same will 
ultimately be required for the rest of the world. In the interim the panoply of intermediate 
arrangements with varying forms of government intervention including impediments to 
the free flow of capital will prevail. Financial crises as occurred in the 1890s and the 
1990s will also continue to be an important part of the process of regime evolution as an 
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M2: Data appendix to Bordo et al (2001), (available on request) for all countries except 
the following: Austria, Komlos (1987); Chile, Bordo and Rockoff (1996); Greece, 
Kostelenos (1995); Netherlands, Bordo and Jonung, (2001); Norway, Bordo and Jonung 
(2001); Portugal, Bordo and Schwartz (1996); Russia, Drummond, (1976). 
 
Nominal GDP, Real GDP, Implicit price deflator and CPI: Data appendix to Bordo et 
al (2001), (available on request) for all countries except the following: Austria, Komlos 
(1987); Chile, Bordo and Rockoff (1996); Greece, Kostelenos (1995); Russia, 
Drummond (1976).  
 
Population: Data appendix to Bordo et al (2001), (available on request) for all countries 
except the following: Austria, Crédit Lyonnais economic studies; Netherlands, Mitchell 
(1992); Russia, Mitchell (1992); Switzerland, Mitchell (1992). 
 
Short Term Interest Rates: Argentina, data provided by Alan Taylor from Obstfeld and 
Taylor (2001); Austria, The Economist; Australia, Bordo and Rockoff (1996); Belgium, 
Mitchell (1992); Brazil, Global financial data; Canada, Bordo and Jonung (1987) (we 
substituted long term interest rates for short term interest rates); Chile, Subercaseaux 
(1926); Denmark, constructed by Marc Flandreau from a variety of national official  
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sources; Finland, Flandreau; France, Bordo (1993); Germany, Bordo (1993); Greece, data 
provided by Olga Charodonlakis; Italy, The Economist; Japan, Bordo (1993); 
Netherlands, Bordo and Jonung (1995); Norway, Flandreau; Portugal, The Economist; 
Russia,  The Economist; Spain,  Flandreau; Sweden, Flandreau; Switzerland, Flandreau; 
UK, Bordo (1993); USA, Bordo (1993). 
 
Government Finance (Expenditures and Tax Receipts) 
 
Argentina, Mitchell (1993); Austria, Mitchell (1992); Australia, David Pope (ANU); 
Belgium, Bordo and Jonung (2001); Brazil, Mitchell (1993); Canada, Bordo and Jonung 
(2001); Chile, Mitchell (1993); Denmark, Bordo and Jonung (2001); Finland, Bordo and 
Jonung (2001); France, Bordo and Jonung (2001); Germany, Bordo and Jonung (2001); 
Greece, Mitchell (1992); Italy, Bordo and Jonung (2001); Japan, Bordo and Jonung 
(2001); Netherlands, Bordo and Jonung (2001); Norway, Bordo and Jonung (2001); 
Portugal, Mitchell (1992); Russia, Mitchell (1992); Spain, Mitchell (1992); Sweden, 
Bordo and Jonung (2001); Switzerland, Bordo and Jonung (2001); UK, Bordo and 
Jonung (2001); USA , Bordo and Jonung (2001). 
 
1973-1997 
M2, Nominal GDP, Real GDP, Population, Implicit price deflator and CPI, 
Government expenditures and Tax receipts.  
44 countries, 22 advanced countries and 22 emerging countries – See Data Appendix to 
Bordo et al (2001). 
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